“And G-d said, let Us make man in Our Image and in Our likeness.”
After creating the world, HaShem proceeds to outline the creation of the being for whom this world was created – man. However, the Medrash tells us that the very creation of man was subject to a very strong disagreement amongst the Malachim .
“Rabbi Simmon said, ‘at the time that HaKadosh Baruch Hu came to create Adam HaRishon, the serving Angels went into various groups and factions; some of them said [that HaShem] should not create him… Chessed said, ‘create him’ because he will do kindness; Emes said, ‘do not create him because they [men] will be full of lies’. Tzedek said ‘create him, because he will do tzedaka’. Shalom said, ‘do not create, because he is full of disputes’. What did HaKadosh Baruch Hu do? He took Emes and threw him to the land…”
This Medrash is telling us that two of the ‘Malachim’, Chessed and Tzedek, were in favor of creating man, whilst another two, Emes and Shalom, were against it. Chessed and Tzedek argued that man would do kindness and give charity. In contrast, the claim of Emes was that creating man would lead to more falsehood, whilst Shalom argued that they would cause much argument. Viewing this dispute, HaShem, who evidently did want to create man, threw down Emes from Heaven, onto the land. Consequently, the single Malach of Shalom was now left alone, outnumbered, facing the two Malachim of Chessed and Tzedek. As a result, HaShem could now proceed to create mankind.
There are numerous difficulties with this Medrash, but we will focus on two of the most pressing questions. Firstly, it seems clear that HaShem wanted to create the world, and therefore wanted Emes and Shalom to be defeated, therefore He chose to send Emes to the land, in order to place Chessed and Tzedek in the majority. But why did He particularly throw down Emes instead of Shalom? Secondly, it would seem that HaShem did not agree with the arguments of Emes and Shalom. What was wrong with their argument and what did throwing down Emes achieve in overriding his case?
Rav Yaakov Kamenetzky zt”l addresses these questions. He begins by explaining the reasoning behind the claims of Emes and Shalom. Emes argued that there was only one ultimate ‘Truth’ in the world, which was the way in which HaShem viewed the world. Accordingly, any other opinion was by definition’ sheker (untrue) in that it contradicted the single Emes. By creating human beings, HaShem would create numerous beings who would inevitably espouse numerous different opinions and beliefs. Since there was only one ‘true’ belief, anything else would constitute falsehood. Therefore, the Malach of Emes argued that man would be full of falsehood and should not be created. Rav Kamenetsky elaborates further that the argument of Shalom stemmed from the same reasoning as that of Emes. Since there was only one true way, anything else would be viewed as wrong. Consequently, there could never be true peace because each person would believe that their fellow was espousing an untrue belief system and way of life. Therefore, Shalom also believed that the creation of man would only have negative consequences.
In response to these arguments, HaShem took Emes from the Heavens, and threw it to the land. Rav Kamenetsky explains the meaning of this enigmatic statement. HaShem acknowledged the arguments of Emes and Shalom. However, He knew that they were based on the fact that there was only one was truth. He changed this by removing the concept of Emes from the Heavens and place it on the Earth. This means that He now gave man the ability to define Emes according to his own reasoning. It was very conceivable that man’s conclusions may differ from those of HaShem, but, as long as they were within certain boundaries, it was now possible for man to create his understanding of Emes. Consequently, many people could formulate a variety of opinions and beliefs, and they could all fall within the category of Emes.
By throwing Emes to the ground, and creating the possibility of there being more than one truth, HaShem also allayed the argument of Shalom that creating man would cause much dispute. The reason for such dispute was that since there was only one truth, there could never be true peace because each person would believe that his fellow was espousing a false ideology. By creating the possibility of there being more than only truth, HaShem made it possible for people to have different opinions without having to believe that their fellow man’s beliefs were untrue. Rather, they represented a different, but valid way of looking at the world.
We can now answer the aforementioned questions. We asked why HaShem threw down Emes instead of Shalom. The answer is that the arguments of both Emes and Shalom stemmed from the same point – that there was only one truth. By throwing down Emes and changing that reality and creating the possibility of more than one ‘truth’, HaShem dispelled the argument of Shalom as well. We can now also answer why HaShem seemingly ignored the arguments of Emes and Shalom. The answer is that He did not ignore them at all, rather by creating the possibility of more than one Truth He responded to their arguments in such a way that would satisfy them.
There are numerous applications to the concept of there being more than one valid truth. One is that a person must be very careful before dismissing approaches to Torah that differ from his own. As long as they are within the realms of Torah thought, they constitute a valid form of Avodas HaShem (service of HaShem). Moreover, if one’s children or other family members choose a different path in their Avodas HaShem, it is important to accept that there is more than one ‘correct’ way of expressing one’s Judaism. We see this from the following story involving Rav Kamenetsky.
A family close to Rav Kamenetsky was shocked when the youngest of their seven sons informed them that he wanted to be a Skverer Chassid. They went together with the boy to Reb Yaakov expecting him to convince their son that boys from proper German-Jewish families do not become Chassidim. To their surprise, Rav Kamenetsky spent his time assuring them that it was not a reflection on them that their son wanted to follow a different path of Avodas Hashem. Obviously, their son had certain emotional needs which, he felt, could be filled by becoming a chassid and they should honor those feelings. Rav Kamenetsky even recommended a step more radical than the parents were willing to consider - sending the boy to a Skverer Yeshiva !
Similarly, a person himself who has been brought up within one stream of Orthodox Judaism, may feel that he can enhance his Avodas HaShem by delving into other streams who emphasize different aspects of Avodas HaShem. By recognizing that there are many valid paths he may be able to revitalize his Avoda and utilize certain talents or drives that are otherwise untapped. May we all merit to find the path that enables us to fulfill our potential.
Showing posts with label truth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label truth. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Sunday, February 7, 2010
EMES AND SHEKER - MISHPATIM
“Distance yourself from falsehood.[1]”
It is well known that honesty is one of the most important midos and that it’s antithesis, falsehood, is one of the most undesirable. The Chinuch speaks very strongly about how disdainful it is to lie: “falsehood is abominable and disgraceful in everyone’s eyes, there is nothing more disgusting than it, and curses come to the home of those who love it.. Therefore the Torah exhorts us to greatly distance ourselves from falsehood, as it says, ’distance yourself from falsehood’[2]” He then explains that the Torah does not use the language of ‘distancing’ with regard to any other negative mitzvo which indicates its severity. Moreover, this teaches us that we should distance ourselves from even the slightest possibility of falsehood. Given the severity of lying, it is worthwhile to clarify what is included within the prohibition of ‘midvar sheker tirchak‘.
It is instructive to analyze the following scenario: Reuven owes Shimon money and the date for repayment has already passed. Shimon phones Reuven to request his money, but Reuven’s wife answers the phone. Reuven does not want to speak to Shimon but he also does not want his wife to lie and say that he is not home when he really is. Therefore Reuven steps just outside his house and instructs his wife to tell Shimon that Reuven is not home - this is technically true, Reuven is now not in the house, even though he could speak to Shimon if he so desired. One may think that this does not constitute falsehood because no false words were spoken. Is this indeed the case?
The Gemara in Nedarim discusses a case in which a man was owed some money so he brought the borrower before Rava’s Beis Din and said to him: “Pay me back.” The borrower responded: “I already paid you.”
Rava said to the borrower: “In that case, you must swear an oath that you have given him the money.”
The borrower went to get his cane, hid the money he owed inside its hollow, and leant on the cane as he returned to the courtroom. He said to the lender: “Hold this cane in your hand,” ostensibly in order to free his own hands to take hold of the Torah scroll. He then took a Torah scroll and swore that he had already given the money into the lender’s hand. The lender, incensed at the man’s chutzpah, broke the cane. Suddenly all the money inside spilled to the ground and it emerged that he had indeed sworn the technical truth!”
The borrower was obviously guilty of terrible midos but did he actually commit a genuine transgression?
The Gemara concludes that he did because an oath taker must adhere not only to the plain definition of his words, but also to the meaning they are meant to convey as well. Consequently, he was guilty of swearing falsely by taking an oath that was technically truthful but deceptive[3].
We learn from here that saying words that are technically true does not mean that a person can deceive others by saying true words with a misleading message. Therefore, it would seem that Reuven’s strategy of standing outside the house does not help avoid the transgression of ‘midvar sheker tirchak.” The words that he is not home may be true but the message is not - Shimon is not interested in the technical location of Reuven; he wants to know if Reuven is present so that Shimon can speak to him. Thus, by saying that he is not present is a misleading message. One may argue that the case in Nedarim was that of an oath, but that in day to day life, perhaps it is allowed to deceive others on condition that words we say are technically true.
The Gemara in Shevuos disproves this theory: The Gemara discusses a number of cases that involve a transgression of ‘midvar sheker tirchak’. One is the case where a talmid chacham claims that someone owes him money but he does not have any witnesses to support his claim. Accordingly he tells his talmid that the ‘borrower’ is clearly lying so he suggests a plan to influence the borrower to admit to the truth. He asks his talmid to come with him to court so that he would appear to be a witness to the loan. The borrower, seeing the prospective witness will realize that he can not escape from the truth and will admit that he does indeed owe the money. The Gemara says that the talmid transgresses, ‘midvar sheker tirchak’ by his actions[4]. In this case, the talmid did not even say anything - he merely walked in with his Rebbe and sent an unsaid message to the borrower that he was a witness to the loan. Moreover, in this case, there is no oath being taken and nevertheless it is an example of falsehood. This proves that even if a person does not even say anything but his actions imply a false metsius then he is considered to be lying. This is all the more so the case where a person says words that are technically true but are also misleading[5].
However, if we analyze one of the most famous incidents in the Torah it would seem that saying technically truthful words is allowed. When Yaakov Avinu pretends to be his brother, Esav, Yitzchak asks him for his identity and he answers, “I am Esav your firstborn.” Rashi explains that he meant by this, “It is I who bring this to you, Esav is your firstborn.” Consequently his words were technically true although Yitzchak could only understand their simple meaning - that he was claiming to be Esav. This would seem to strongly question the premise that has been thus far established. My Rebbi, Rav Yitzchak Berkovits Shlita explains that Yaakov’s deft wording in and of itself did not justify lying to Yitzchak. Rather, the commentaries explain that Yaakov was justified in deceiving Esav because Esav himself was a trickster and it is allowed to use deceit in order to overcome a deceitful person[6]. Why then did Yaakov need to resort to the ’word games’? The Orchos Tzaddikim writes that even when it is permissible to lie it is still nonetheless preferable to say words that are technically true. As a consequence, Yaakov did not want to release false words from his lips.
Nonetheless we should not be mistaken into thinking that saying words that are technically true justifies misleading others when there is no valid justification to do so and it constitutes a clear violation of midvar sheker tirchak. It is very important to educate our children on this point so that they realize that the prohibition to lie is not avoided by clever wording[7]. Moreover, it is necessary for us to clarify the gedarim of this easily misunderstood mitzvo. The Chinuch stresses that Hashem is a ‘G-d of Emes’ and that bracho only comes to a person who strives to emulate Hashem. May we all succeed in living lives of genuine emes.
WHEN SHEKER IS EMES
The Gemara in Kesubos discusses the case of a wedding where the chassan asks his friend of his opinion about the kallah. Beis Hillel argues that he should not say the brutal truth about the kallah, rather he should praise her even if he does not really believe in what he is saying. We learn from here there are times when it is permissible and even correct to lie. A friend recently pointed out to me one area in which there is a common tendency amongst people to be ‘honest’ in a situation where it would be kinder to hide the truth.
Very often a person may be telling over a dvar Torah, story or a piece of good news and he will be interrupted by the listener who proudly informs him that he has already heard it before. Consequently the speaker feel somewhat deflated that he was not able to share useful information. It would seem from the Gemara in Kesubos that it is permissible to lie in such a case and pretend that we have never heard this before, thereby enabling the speaker to derive pleasure from being the source of new information. Moreover, it would seem that one should lie in such an instance. There is a ‘maaseh rav’ that supports this argument. Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzensky zt”l was once in a meeting with other Rabbeim when a bachur suddenly came in and told him a piece of good news. Rav Chaim Ozer showed great joy and thanked th bachur for being the source of such good news. A few minutes later a different bachur entered and told over the same information, unaware that Rav Chaim Ozer had already been told. Nonetheless, Rav Chaim Ozer pretended that he had not heard it before and warmly thanked the bachur. This happened again a number of times. The Rabbeim with him asked him why he persisted in acting as if he had never heard the news. He explained that each bachur would gain great pleasure from being the person who could tell him this pleasant news and that it would deflate them if he would tell them that he already knew it. We learn from here that there are times when hiding the truth can be the right way to act.
[1] Mishpatim, 23:1.
[2] Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvo 74.
[3] Nedarim, 25a, based on the translation and explanation of Reb Howard Jackson Shlita.
[4] Shevuos, 30b.
[5] See also the Maharal’s explanation of the episode with Avraham and Sarah in which Hashem is meshaneh for darchay shalom. The Maharal explains that although Hashem’s words were technically true, Chazal nonetheless describe them as constituting a shinui because their message was misleading. (Vayeira, 18:13, Gur Aryeh, Os 40.
[6] See Emes Le Yaakov, Toldos, 27:12. It is important to be aware that this principle should not be used without prior clarification from a competent halachic authority. It is quite easy to be moreh heter and decide that anyone against us constitutes the kind of person that we are allowed to deceive.
[7] It is important to note that this concept also teaches that there are times when we may say words that are technically inaccurate but their message is not misleading. For example, in a place where weddings regularly start an hour later than the announced time, it does not constitutes sheker to call the chupa for 7.00pm even though it will really begin at 8.00pm. This is a delicate area in halacho and it is advisable to learn the details of ‘midvar sheker tirchak so that one can know what is permissible and forbidden.
It is well known that honesty is one of the most important midos and that it’s antithesis, falsehood, is one of the most undesirable. The Chinuch speaks very strongly about how disdainful it is to lie: “falsehood is abominable and disgraceful in everyone’s eyes, there is nothing more disgusting than it, and curses come to the home of those who love it.. Therefore the Torah exhorts us to greatly distance ourselves from falsehood, as it says, ’distance yourself from falsehood’[2]” He then explains that the Torah does not use the language of ‘distancing’ with regard to any other negative mitzvo which indicates its severity. Moreover, this teaches us that we should distance ourselves from even the slightest possibility of falsehood. Given the severity of lying, it is worthwhile to clarify what is included within the prohibition of ‘midvar sheker tirchak‘.
It is instructive to analyze the following scenario: Reuven owes Shimon money and the date for repayment has already passed. Shimon phones Reuven to request his money, but Reuven’s wife answers the phone. Reuven does not want to speak to Shimon but he also does not want his wife to lie and say that he is not home when he really is. Therefore Reuven steps just outside his house and instructs his wife to tell Shimon that Reuven is not home - this is technically true, Reuven is now not in the house, even though he could speak to Shimon if he so desired. One may think that this does not constitute falsehood because no false words were spoken. Is this indeed the case?
The Gemara in Nedarim discusses a case in which a man was owed some money so he brought the borrower before Rava’s Beis Din and said to him: “Pay me back.” The borrower responded: “I already paid you.”
Rava said to the borrower: “In that case, you must swear an oath that you have given him the money.”
The borrower went to get his cane, hid the money he owed inside its hollow, and leant on the cane as he returned to the courtroom. He said to the lender: “Hold this cane in your hand,” ostensibly in order to free his own hands to take hold of the Torah scroll. He then took a Torah scroll and swore that he had already given the money into the lender’s hand. The lender, incensed at the man’s chutzpah, broke the cane. Suddenly all the money inside spilled to the ground and it emerged that he had indeed sworn the technical truth!”
The borrower was obviously guilty of terrible midos but did he actually commit a genuine transgression?
The Gemara concludes that he did because an oath taker must adhere not only to the plain definition of his words, but also to the meaning they are meant to convey as well. Consequently, he was guilty of swearing falsely by taking an oath that was technically truthful but deceptive[3].
We learn from here that saying words that are technically true does not mean that a person can deceive others by saying true words with a misleading message. Therefore, it would seem that Reuven’s strategy of standing outside the house does not help avoid the transgression of ‘midvar sheker tirchak.” The words that he is not home may be true but the message is not - Shimon is not interested in the technical location of Reuven; he wants to know if Reuven is present so that Shimon can speak to him. Thus, by saying that he is not present is a misleading message. One may argue that the case in Nedarim was that of an oath, but that in day to day life, perhaps it is allowed to deceive others on condition that words we say are technically true.
The Gemara in Shevuos disproves this theory: The Gemara discusses a number of cases that involve a transgression of ‘midvar sheker tirchak’. One is the case where a talmid chacham claims that someone owes him money but he does not have any witnesses to support his claim. Accordingly he tells his talmid that the ‘borrower’ is clearly lying so he suggests a plan to influence the borrower to admit to the truth. He asks his talmid to come with him to court so that he would appear to be a witness to the loan. The borrower, seeing the prospective witness will realize that he can not escape from the truth and will admit that he does indeed owe the money. The Gemara says that the talmid transgresses, ‘midvar sheker tirchak’ by his actions[4]. In this case, the talmid did not even say anything - he merely walked in with his Rebbe and sent an unsaid message to the borrower that he was a witness to the loan. Moreover, in this case, there is no oath being taken and nevertheless it is an example of falsehood. This proves that even if a person does not even say anything but his actions imply a false metsius then he is considered to be lying. This is all the more so the case where a person says words that are technically true but are also misleading[5].
However, if we analyze one of the most famous incidents in the Torah it would seem that saying technically truthful words is allowed. When Yaakov Avinu pretends to be his brother, Esav, Yitzchak asks him for his identity and he answers, “I am Esav your firstborn.” Rashi explains that he meant by this, “It is I who bring this to you, Esav is your firstborn.” Consequently his words were technically true although Yitzchak could only understand their simple meaning - that he was claiming to be Esav. This would seem to strongly question the premise that has been thus far established. My Rebbi, Rav Yitzchak Berkovits Shlita explains that Yaakov’s deft wording in and of itself did not justify lying to Yitzchak. Rather, the commentaries explain that Yaakov was justified in deceiving Esav because Esav himself was a trickster and it is allowed to use deceit in order to overcome a deceitful person[6]. Why then did Yaakov need to resort to the ’word games’? The Orchos Tzaddikim writes that even when it is permissible to lie it is still nonetheless preferable to say words that are technically true. As a consequence, Yaakov did not want to release false words from his lips.
Nonetheless we should not be mistaken into thinking that saying words that are technically true justifies misleading others when there is no valid justification to do so and it constitutes a clear violation of midvar sheker tirchak. It is very important to educate our children on this point so that they realize that the prohibition to lie is not avoided by clever wording[7]. Moreover, it is necessary for us to clarify the gedarim of this easily misunderstood mitzvo. The Chinuch stresses that Hashem is a ‘G-d of Emes’ and that bracho only comes to a person who strives to emulate Hashem. May we all succeed in living lives of genuine emes.
WHEN SHEKER IS EMES
The Gemara in Kesubos discusses the case of a wedding where the chassan asks his friend of his opinion about the kallah. Beis Hillel argues that he should not say the brutal truth about the kallah, rather he should praise her even if he does not really believe in what he is saying. We learn from here there are times when it is permissible and even correct to lie. A friend recently pointed out to me one area in which there is a common tendency amongst people to be ‘honest’ in a situation where it would be kinder to hide the truth.
Very often a person may be telling over a dvar Torah, story or a piece of good news and he will be interrupted by the listener who proudly informs him that he has already heard it before. Consequently the speaker feel somewhat deflated that he was not able to share useful information. It would seem from the Gemara in Kesubos that it is permissible to lie in such a case and pretend that we have never heard this before, thereby enabling the speaker to derive pleasure from being the source of new information. Moreover, it would seem that one should lie in such an instance. There is a ‘maaseh rav’ that supports this argument. Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzensky zt”l was once in a meeting with other Rabbeim when a bachur suddenly came in and told him a piece of good news. Rav Chaim Ozer showed great joy and thanked th bachur for being the source of such good news. A few minutes later a different bachur entered and told over the same information, unaware that Rav Chaim Ozer had already been told. Nonetheless, Rav Chaim Ozer pretended that he had not heard it before and warmly thanked the bachur. This happened again a number of times. The Rabbeim with him asked him why he persisted in acting as if he had never heard the news. He explained that each bachur would gain great pleasure from being the person who could tell him this pleasant news and that it would deflate them if he would tell them that he already knew it. We learn from here that there are times when hiding the truth can be the right way to act.
[1] Mishpatim, 23:1.
[2] Sefer HaChinuch, Mitzvo 74.
[3] Nedarim, 25a, based on the translation and explanation of Reb Howard Jackson Shlita.
[4] Shevuos, 30b.
[5] See also the Maharal’s explanation of the episode with Avraham and Sarah in which Hashem is meshaneh for darchay shalom. The Maharal explains that although Hashem’s words were technically true, Chazal nonetheless describe them as constituting a shinui because their message was misleading. (Vayeira, 18:13, Gur Aryeh, Os 40.
[6] See Emes Le Yaakov, Toldos, 27:12. It is important to be aware that this principle should not be used without prior clarification from a competent halachic authority. It is quite easy to be moreh heter and decide that anyone against us constitutes the kind of person that we are allowed to deceive.
[7] It is important to note that this concept also teaches that there are times when we may say words that are technically inaccurate but their message is not misleading. For example, in a place where weddings regularly start an hour later than the announced time, it does not constitutes sheker to call the chupa for 7.00pm even though it will really begin at 8.00pm. This is a delicate area in halacho and it is advisable to learn the details of ‘midvar sheker tirchak so that one can know what is permissible and forbidden.
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